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Explaining the recurrent fluctuations in prices and 
quantities known as the business cycle is one of the 
major tasks of macroeconomics. To study these dy-
namics, macroeconomists construct models, usually 
systems of equations, which are attempts to describe 
how key aggregate economic variables like output, the 
price level, interest rates, and the stock of money evolve 
and influence each other over time. Among the models 
that macroeconomists can use to gather evidence on 
business cycle dynamics is a relatively simple type: 
vector autoregressions (VARs). In these models, each 
member of a group of random variables is expressed as 
a linear function of past values of itself, past values of 
the other members of the group, and nonrandom com-
ponents, such as constant terms or polynomial functions 
of time. 
Over the last ten years or so, VARs have become 
popular among economists, especially as tools for 
routine forecasting. Using VARs to provide evidence on 
theories of business cycle dynamics is, however, contro-
versial. One reason for this is the belief that empirical 
results from estimated VARs are not robust, or stable.
1 
The idea is that VAR statistics are very sensitive to 
seemingly minor or arbitrary modifications in the 
VAR's random and nonrandom components. Thus, 
some believe, a VAR model's evidence on the dynamic 
relationships among its variables can provide little 
usable information. 
Views on the robustness of VAR evidence have been 
stimulated in no small part by the work of Christopher 
Sims (1980b). Using monthly U.S. data for 1947-78, 
Sims estimated a VAR with four variables (interest 
rates, money, the price level, and output) in order to get 
evidence on the dynamic relationships among these 
variables, especially the relationship between money 
and output. One of Sims' main conclusions was unex-
pected by many: the evidence from his model contra-
dicted a specific version of monetarist theory that was 
prominent in the 1970s. Sims (1980b, p. 252) high-
lighted one "strikingly nonmonetarist" result: unpredict-
ed variations associated with the money stock account 
for only 4 percent of the unpredicted variation in output. 
Skeptics have questioned the robustness of Sims' 
findings and thus VAR evidence in general. Stephen 
King (1983), David Runkle (1987), and David Spencer 
1 Another reason for the controversy is the belief that some VAR results are 
only superficially nonmonetarist. To make this point, some economists have 
developed theoretical and statistical models illustrating how monetary policy 
could be an important determinant of output even in an economy in which a 
time series analysis would show little relationship between output and the 
quantity of money. (See the work of Bennett McCallum, 1983; Thomas Cooley 
and Stephen LeRoy, 1985; Edward Learner, 1985; Ben Bernanke, 1986; and 
Christopher Sims, 1986.) 
This line of thinking played an important role in the evolution of VAR 
analysis in the 1980s. In this paper, however, I have nothing new to say about it. 
Still, in deference to its importance, let me warn the reader that I will interpret 
VAR results somewhat naively. That is, I will describe various numerical results 
as supporting or contradicting a certain strong version of monetarism depend-
ing on whether a fairly simple, straightforward interpretation of the VAR results 
suggests that money's role in price and output determination jives with the 
predictions of the theory. It might be more scrupulous to describe such results as 
superficially supporting or contradicting the theory. I reject this option as too 
clumsy and tedious, but invite the reader to supply such qualifiers as needed. I 
also encourage exploration of the extent to which more sophisticated interpre-
tations of my results would change them. 
19 (1989) particularly questioned the robustness of Sims' 
evidence against monetarism. Switch a few features of 
the model from the forms Sims chose to other equally 
plausible forms, they said, and some of his results weak-
en considerably or disappear. Modifications shown to 
help produce at least mild evidence of nonrobustness 
include adding a time trend, switching from monthly to 
quarterly data, adding more past values of variables, 
and switching to alternative measurements of the 
variables (for example, replacing the producer price 
index with the consumer price index). Furthermore, the 
apparent nonrobustness of Sims' nonmonetarist find-
ings has led some critics to speculate that the nonro-
bustness of VAR evidence on business cycle issues 
could be a widespread or even universal phenomenon. 
(See, for example, Spencer 1989, pp. 452-53; Runkle 
1987, p. 442.) 
Sims has partially accepted the criticisms of the skep-
tics in the sense that he has not tried to defend his 1980 
results to the last decimal place (Sims 1987, p. 443). 
But he has stood by key parts of his results as well as the 
usefulness of his VAR method (Sims 1987, 1989). 
Sims still claims that his low estimate of money's role 
in output determination is probably fairly accurate and 
that his 1980 evidence against the particular form 
of monetarism he had targeted is robust (Sims 1987, 
pp. 443, 448; 1989, p. 491). Implicitly, then, Sims 
claims that his 1980 findings provide an example of 
how even simple VARs can be used to present impor-
tant evidence on a theoretical issue. 
In some respects, this continuing debate between 
Sims and his critics is anachronistic. The debate has 
more or less outlived the object of Sims' investigation: 
the specific form of monetarism he presented evidence 
against is no longer widely believed. The debate has 
also outlived Sims' methodology: current VAR analyses 
are often built upon more elaborate statistical and 
theoretical assumptions, such as Bayesian priors or 
nonrecursive identification schemes. So what this ap-
pears to be is a vigorous, ongoing debate about evi-
dence on a discarded theory produced by a superseded 
methodology. 
In other respects, however, this debate remains 
timely and important. The findings of Sims and his 
critics have been used to support broad claims that 
continue to color general opinions of not only VAR 
analyses but also time series analyses in general. 
Therefore, I here reexamine the conclusions reached by 
both Sims and his critics. My approach is to estimate 
hundreds of variations of Sims' model and then try to 
pick out any statistically reasonable ones that appear to 
contradict some of Sims' key results. 
I find that both sides of the debate have some merit. 
About Sims' 1980 results, I find, as did Sims' critics, that 
several of his estimates of one variable's role in the 
determination of another, including his low estimate of 
money's role in output determination, are not robust. 
That is, I find many alternative specifications that 
appear to be as plausible as Sims' model yet have 
significantly different implications about at least one 
variable's role in determining another. However, I find 
few models that even come close to supporting the 
version of monetarism Sims evaluated. In that sense, I 
find, as Sims did, that his evidence against this specific 
form of monetarism is robust. 
At the more general level, I again find some truth on 
each side. I agree with the critics that many results from 
VAR models, at least those constructed with generic 
macroeconomic variables such as output or prices, may 
in fact not be robust. However, I also agree with Sims 
that nonrobustness is not a general property of VAR 
results and that even simple VARs can sometimes 
provide useful evidence on economic issues. In short, 
it is not generally true that all VAR results are robust or 
that none are. What does seem true—and what this 
study demonstrates—is that researchers using VARs 
should check their results for robustness. 
A VAR View of Monetarism ... 
Sims (1980b) analyzed the dynamic behavior of the 
U.S. economy in the postwar period (1947-78).
2 His 
focus, at least initially, was on how well the perform-
ance of the economy conforms to the predictions of a 
simple and rather strong version of monetarist theory. 
The core of monetarism is the belief that monetary 
policy is an important cause of fluctuations in the 
growth of output and the price level. As stated, this 
belief is too vague to be used by policymakers or tested 
by economists. Thus, operational versions of monetar-
ism surround the core belief with more specific state-
ments about just what monetary policy means and just 
how important it is. 
In his 1980 article, Sims examined a version of 
monetarism that he later called monism (1987, p. 448). 
This form of monetarism has four key elements. Sims 
(1980b, p. 250) explicitly listed the two most distinctive 
elements: 
2Sims also analyzed the dynamic behavior of the U.S. economy in the 
interwar period (1919-41) and contrasted it to the behavior of the postwar 
economy. This part of his work has received little attention, and I will not 
reexamine it here. 
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1. Monetary policy, or its instability, is the primary 
cause of business cycles. 
2. The time path of the quantity of money in circu-
lation is a good indicator of monetary policy. 
Other versions of monetarism differ with at least one of 
these points. Some downplay monetary policy's pri-
macy as the cause of business cycles (without dismiss-
ing its importance altogether). And some hold that the 
quantity of money is, by itself, not necessarily a good 
indicator of monetary policy. 
The other two key elements of monism, though not 
explicitly listed by Sims, have been clearly expressed by 
monetarist authors of the 1960s and 1970s, such as 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) and 
William Poole (1978). These elements can be inferred 
as either implicit in Sims' text or common to most forms 
of monetarism: 
3. Changes in the quantity of money are the primary 
cause of business cycles because these changes 
cause, lead, and are positively related to changes 
in output (at least in the short run). 
4. Changes in the quantity of money lead, are posi-
tively related to, and are the primary determinants 
of changes in the price level (at least in the long 
run). 
To test this monist theory, Sims (1980b) used a 
simple, four-variable VAR and some techniques he had 
developed for analyzing economic issues with VARs. 
The four variables, again, are output, prices, interest 
rates, and money. Sims used data on these variables 
from the postwar period to try to estimate whether the 
quantity of money plays a leading role in explaining the 
fluctuations of output and prices. 
To do this, Sims had to specify exactly which data he 
would use. He chose monthly rather than quarterly or 
annual data, perhaps in hopes of getting more precise 
measures of the dynamic interactions among the vari-
ables. This meant he could not use the U.S. Commerce 
Department's data on real gross national product 
(GNP), since they are not available monthly. Instead, he 
measured output by industrial production (IP), a com-
monly used monthly output indicator compiled and 
published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Sims measured the overall price level by the U.S. Labor 
Department's producer price index (PPI). To provide an 
alternative to the money stock as a source of business 
cycle fluctuations, he drew from empirical studies 
which suggested that interest rates might be important. 
In particular, he used the interest rate on four-to-six-
month commercial paper (C-paper).
3 To represent the 
stock of money, he chose the Fed's Ml, a standard 
measure of money which then consisted mainly of 
currency and non-interest-bearing checking accounts. 
For estimating money's impact, Sims specified a 
vector autoregression of the logarithms of his four 
variables. The model had one equation for each vari-
able, and each equation had the same form: 49 un-
known coefficients that multiplied a constant term and 
one year of past, or lagged, values (12 lags in all, for his 
monthly data) of each of the four variables. Sims' 




(1) rt = kr+ A=1 ari rt-i + A=1 bri mt-i 
+ A=1 CriPt-i + A=i driyt-i + ert 
(2) mt = km + A=1 ami r,_f- + A=1 bmi 
+ A=1 CmiPt-i + A=i dmiyt-i + emt 
(3) pt = kp + i api rt-i + bpi mt-i 




(4) yt = ky + A=1 ayi rt-i + A=i byi mt-t 
+ A=i cyipt-i + A=1 dyiyt-i + eyt 
where t is time; r, m, py and y are the logarithms of 
interest rates, money, prices, and output, respectively; 
the k, a, b, c, and d terms are coefficients that determine 
how the variables interact; and the e's are the error 
terms, which capture the monthly unexplained or sur-
prise movement in each variable. 
Sims estimated the unknowns in his model by apply-
ing ordinary least squares regression to each equation 
separately for the sample period from January 1948 to 
December 1978. Besides estimates of the 49 coeffi-
cients in each equation, this gave him estimates of each 
equation's historical error term. Sims used these to 
compute X, the variance-covariance matrix of the error 
terms, a measure of the correlation among the surprise 
movements in each variable. 
Sims used the estimated version of his model to 
measure the dynamic interactions among the variables 
in two different ways. One summary measure, the 
3This somewhat unusual choice for interest rates was in part dictated by 
Sims' goal of comparing the interwar and postwar periods. More commonly 
used postwar measures of interest rates were not available for the interwar 
period. 
21 forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), analyzes 
the errors the model would tend to make if it were used 
to forecast its variables. The FEVD is meant to show 
how much of the average squared forecast error which 
the model would tend to make is caused by surprise 
movements associated with each of the variables in the 
model. The FEVD of a variable thus can suggest that 
forces associated with one variable are major influ-
ences on the evolution of another variable. If, for 
example, money's share of the FEVD of output were 
relatively large, then the fundamental factors deter-
mining money would seem to be a relatively important 
source of fluctuations in output. Sims' other summary 
measure, the impulse response; shows how one variable 
responds over time to a single surprise increase in itself 
or in another variable. This, too, can suggest evolu-
tionary influences for each variable. Monetarists, for 
example, might expect that a surprise jump in the 
quantity of money (if caused by an unanticipated easing 
of monetary policy) would, over the next several years, 
cause output to rise gradually but significantly above 
where it would have been otherwise and then fall back 
to its original path. 
Before Sims could calculate these summary mea-
sures, however, he had to add one set of assumptions to 
his estimated model. Both of the measures require that 
the notion of a surprise movement associated with each 
of the model's variables be precisely defined. The error 
vector 
(5) et — \en emt ept eyt]
T 
jointly summarizes the surprise movements in the 
model at time t. But economic theory and estimated 
covariance matrices suggest that the individual compo-
nents of this vector are interrelated. Thus, it would not 
make sense to, for example, treat ert and emt as though 
they were independent surprise movements in, respec-
tively, interest rates and money. Sims solved this 
problem by assuming a simple model of how the 
correlations among the components of the estimated 
e/s could be derived from an underlying set of uncorre-
cted random shocks to the economy. Making assump-
tions like this is called identifying the model; this process 
uniquely links observed variables that have ambiguous 
theoretical interpretations (such as the components of 
et) to unobserved variables with clearer theoretical 
interpretations. 
Sims identified his model by assuming a recursive 
chain of causality among the surprises in any given 
month. (See the Appendix.) Although he did not say so 
explicitly, he seems to have begun by positing a 
nonmonist policy regime. In this regime, the quantity of 
money is not a good indicator of monetary policy; 
instead, monetary policymakers set interest rates. Sims 
here relabeled the discrepancy between the expected 
and the actual interest rate at time t, or ert, as urt and 
interpreted it as a shock to a horizontal intramonth 
money supply function. This shock is random from the 
point of view of the VAR model, but is thought of as 
being generated by the nonrandom decisions of the 
monetary authority. In effect, Sims assumed that, in this 
nonmonist regime, monetary policy operates by shift-
ing a horizontal intramonth money supply curve so as to 
peg interest rates for the month. 
Next Sims implicitly posited a downward-sloping 
intramonth money demand curve. This implies that the 
surprise movement in money, emU has two components: 
amurv which reflects the intramonth effect of moving 
along the money demand curve in response to the 
monthly policy shock to interest rates, and umt, which 
represents the underlying random shift in money de-
mand at time t. 
Then Sims turned to the surprise movement in the 
price level. He assumed that ept has three components: 
apurt, to reflect the intramonth effect on prices of the 
monetary policy shock to interest rates; Ppumt, to reflect 
the intramonth effect on prices of the random shift in 
money demand; and upt, to represent the remaining 
surprise movement in prices at time t. Sims didn't say 
what model he had in mind here, but it doesn't matter 
much for the purpose of evaluating monism. 
Similarly, the exact interpretation of all of the four 
components of the surprise movement in output, eyt, is 
not too important. The components of interest for Sims' 
purposes, ayurt and fiyumt, reflect effects on intramonth 
output stemming from, respectively, the random policy 
shock to interest rates and the money demand shock. 
The component yyupt is associated in some unspecified 
way with factors determining prices. The remaining 
component, uyt, represents a random shock to some of 
the remaining intramonth factors that affect output. 
In matrix notation, the intramonthly model can be 
concisely written as 
(6) et = Aut 
where 
(7) — [ert emt ept eyt] 
(8) u't=[urt umt upt uyt] 
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1  0  0  0 
«m  1  0  0 
UP  Pp  1  0 
CLy  Py  yy  1 
The triangular pattern of the matrix A, with ones on the 
diagonal and zeros above, reflects the causal pattern 
Sims (1980b) assumed. Effects flow only downward, 
from variables earlier in the causal chain to those later. 
To make this assumed intramonthly model opera-
tional, Sims used the elements of 2, the variance-
covariance matrix of the e/s, to compute the a, and y 
coefficients as population regression coefficients. This 
means, for example, that am is picked to equal the ratio 
between the historical covariance of ert and emt and the 
historical variance of ert. It also means that, on average, 
all of the component common to ert and emt is attributed 
to urt alone. 
... With Controversial Results 
Sims' VAR Evidence 
Sims used his model to compute statistics that summa-
rized the dynamic interactions among the variables— 
with unexpected results. Sims' statistics appeared to 
contradict monism, the simple form of monetarism he 
was examining. They implied that shocks associated 
with the money stock played a very small role in the 
determination of postwar output. The results had im-
plications beyond monism, though. The model said 
money's role in output determination was so small that 
it seemed to challenge a wide variety of models that 
embodied the general monetarist belief that fluctu-
ations in the money stock influenced output to at least 
some degree. 
Shocks associated with the money stock were clearly 
not the dominant source of output fluctuations when 
Sims' model was identified with his nonmonist policy 
regime. There, remember, the causal chain ran from 
interest rates to money to prices to output. In analyzing 
the errors that that model would tend to make when 
forecasting output four years ahead, Sims estimated 
that the cumulative effects of money demand shocks to 
the money stock (the wm,'s, not the emf's) would account 
for only 4 percent of the average squared error. Mone-
tary policy shocks to interest rates seemed to be much 
more important, accounting for 30 percent of that error. 
Sims checked whether the unimportance of shocks 
associated with the quantity of money stemmed primar-
ily from his assumption of a nonmonist policy regime, 
where money shocks come from the demand side rather 
than the supply or policy side. To do this, he repeated his 
analysis with a more monist regime, embodied in a 
different causal chain: from money to interest rates to 
prices to output. (Again, see the Appendix.) He re-
labeled emt as umt and identified it as a monetary policy 
shock to a vertical intramonth money supply curve. In 
this chain, ert was interpreted as having a component 
that represented movements along the money demand 
curve in response to money supply shocks and a 
component, urt, that represented random shifts in mon-
ey demand. The rest of the chain was as before, with umt 
and urt playing the roles previously assigned to urt and 
umt, respectively. This second identification, where all 
surprise movements in money are assumed to reflect 
policy decisions, produced nearly the same results as 
the first. Sims took this as evidence that his original 
findings were not caused by a simple confounding of 
policy and nonpolicy shocks to the money stock. 
Sims had found that shocks associated with the 
quantity of money were far from the primary determi-
nant of output, regardless of whether the monetary 
policy variable was interest rates or the money stock. 
This he considered strong evidence against monism, the 
simple form of monetarism he had identified as his 
target. That version of monetarism asserted, again, that 
changes in the quantity of money were the best measure 
of monetary policy and monetary policy was the main 
cause of output fluctuations. 
Sims was not as confident about his evidence that 
money had almost no effect on output, but he did 
explore its implications. He attempted to reinterpret the 
fact, documented by monetarist scholars, that fluctu-
ations in the money stock were positively correlated 
with subsequent fluctuations in output. One reinterpre-
tation was statistical. Sims noted that shocks associated 
with interest rates accounted for over 50 percent of the 
four-year FEVD of the money stock. Furthermore, his 
impulse responses showed that both output and money 
responded to shocks to interest rates in roughly the 
same way: with a smooth, slowly building but sustained 
decline. Sims proposed the common response of output 
and the money stock to interest rate shocks as a 
statistical alternative to monism for explaining the 
empirical correlation between fluctuations in money 
and output. Sims also offered a theoretical alternative. 
He sketched a Keynesian investment model in which 
anticipated declines in the real return to capital raise 
current interest rates and, with a delay, depress produc-
tion. The anticipated decline in output causes the 
23 money stock to fall, gradually and somewhat ahead of 
the actual decline in output, by smoothly reducing the 
demand for money. 
The Critical Response 
Sims' evidence against monetarism naturally received a 
lot of attention. This was especially true of his most 
surprising finding, that the money stock plays essen-
tially no role in output determination. A prominent line 
of criticism during the 1980s was that Sims' particular 
empirical results, and possibly VAR results in general, 
are not robust. 
Robustness, again, means that the results do not 
change significantly when the model is modified in an 
arbitrary way. Arbitrary, in turn, means that there is no 
strong economic or statistical argument that either mod-
el is clearly superior to or conceptually different from 
the other. To criticize Sims' results as not robust thus 
involves proposing a seemingly innocent modification 
of his model and showing that the modified model gives 
results that are sufficiently different from those of his 
model to call into question the validity of his results. 
Several researchers have presented evidence against 
the robustness of Sims' results. As Table 1 shows, they 
find that several simple modifications of Sims' specifi-
cation lead to rather different numbers. King (1983), 
for example, added three lags and a time trend to Sims' 
model, changed the interest rate data to the rate on U.S. 
Treasury bills (T-bills), and then estimated the model 
on a slightly later time period. He found that these 
changes resulted in money's share in the four-year-
ahead FEVD of output rising from Sims' 4 percent to 24 
percent. Similar results were obtained for models 
involving other modifications—quarterly data, two-
year lags, and different measures of the price level and 
output. (See Table 1.) 
Criticism of Sims' findings has tended to focus on 
money's and interest rates' shares in the FEVD of 
output at the expense of other indicators of the monetar-
ist or nonmonetarist properties of estimated models. In 
part, this is probably because the small share Sims 
found for money and the much larger share he found for 
interest rates were his most surprising results. For some, 
though, another factor was involved. King (1983, p. 7) 
noted, for example, that Sims' interpretation of his 
results "influenced a number of authors to attempt to 
reformulate business cycle theories away from the 
exclusive concentration on the money supply." By 
challenging the robustness of Sims' numbers, especially 
the robustness of his small money share, critics like 
Spencer (1989, p. 453) meant to question the necessity 
of reformulating business cycle theory. They were not 
necessarily concerned with defending monism, and 
perhaps for this reason they generally did not check the 
implications of their respecified models for all four 
elements of monism. 
Some critics also drew broader conclusions from 
their study of Sims' results. The sensitivity of Sims' 
numbers to simple changes in specification, as well as 
the considerable statistical imprecision of estimated 
VAR impulse responses and FEVDs, led them to 
question in general the usefulness of evidence from 
whole classes of VARs. Runkle's (1987, p. 442) results 
suggested to him that "it may be difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about economic relations from unrestricted 
VAR's," though he withheld judgment about VARs 
restricted by Bayesian priors or by identifying assump-
tions more sophisticated than Sims' causal chains. 
Spencer (1989, p. 453) affirmed Runkle's generaliza-
tion and added remarks that seem to question any in-
ferences drawn from VARs, restricted or not. 
Another VAR View ... 
Sims (1987) has objected that some of the changes 
critics have proposed for his model are not arbitrary. If 
correct, that would mean the large role in output 
determination that the critics' models found for money 
cannot be considered a legitimate challenge to the 
robustness of Sims' money number. Sims has also 
pointed out that both his model and many of his critics' 
found that interest rates' role in output determination is 
larger than money's role. This suggests that at least this 
part of Sims' nonmonist conclusion is robust. Neither 
Sims nor his critics, however, have thoroughly explored 
beyond this point in the debate. 
I attempt to do that. I check whether Sims' results 
hold up for hundreds of variations of his specification— 
most of the possible combinations of the modifications 
shown in Table 1 plus others. I also use statistical tests 
to help evaluate whether the proposed modifications 
can be viewed as arbitrary and whether the results they 
produce are really strong evidence of nonrobustness. 
The least controversial of the modifications, in the 
sense that neither Sims nor his critics have raised 
theoretical or statistical objections to them, involves 
replacing one data series by another that in principle 
measures the same concept over the same interval of 
time. I try this change on all of the variables in Table 1 
except Martin Eichenbaum and Kenneth Singleton's 
(1986) real interest rates, which I regard as conceptu-
ally distinct from Sims' choice of nominal rates. As 
measures of the price level, I replace Sims' PPI with the 
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Table 1 
How Simple Changes in Sims' Model Have Changed His Results 
Specification Different From Sims' 





(% Share of 4-Year 
FEVD of Output) 
Studies 
Interest 














C-Paper  PPI  IP  1  C  M  48:1-78:12  4  30 
King  T-Bills  PPI  IP  1.25  C,T  M  50:1-81:6  24  29 




T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  1  C,T5  M  59:2-79:12  19  27 
Runkle  C-Paper  PPI  IP  1  C,T  Q  48:1 -78:IV  22  34 
(1987) 
T-Bills  PPI  IP  1  C,T  Q  48:1 -78:IV  28  27 
Spencer  T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  1  C,T  M  48:1-78:12  19.5  n.a. 
(1989) 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  1  C  Q  48:1 —78:IV  19.5  n.a. 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  1  C,T  Q  48:1 —78:IV  27.4  n.a. 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  2  C  M  48:1-78:12  19.9  n.a. 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  2  C,T  M  48:1-78:12  23.3  n.a. 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  2  C  Q  48:1 -78:IV  28.9  n.a. 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  2  C,T  Q  48:1 -78:IV  27.1  n.a. 
FEVD = forecast error variance decomposition 
n.a. = not available 
1 All of these studies used the Federal Reserve Board's M1 as their money variable. Most variables are logged, and all except interest rates are seasonally 
adjusted. 
2Most interest rate variables are net and nominal. Sims' is the rate on six-month commercial paper; Eichenbaum and Singleton's, the ex post inflation-
adjusted rate on one-month Treasury bills; and the others', the rate on three-month Treasury bills. King's are gross rates. 
3The PPI is the producer price index for all items; the CPI-S, the consumer price index for all items except shelter. Both are U.S. Labor Department series. 
The deflator is the measure that the U.S. Commerce Department uses to adjust the gross national product for inflation. 
4For output, most studies used only the Federal Reserve Board's index of industrial production. King also used the U.S. Commerce Department's measure of 
real gross national product. 
5Before estimating their model, Eichenbaum and Singleton subtracted a constant and a linear trend from all their variables except interest rates. 
25 Commerce Department's implicit GNP price deflator 
and the Labor Department's consumer price index for 
all items less shelter (CPI-S). As measures of output, I 
use real GNP as well as Sims' IP. For interest rates, I use 
those on three-month T-bills as well as those on six-
month C-paper. Finally, I examine two alternative 
measures of the money stock—the monetary base (MB) 
and M2—that Sims and his critics have examined only 
briefly or not at all. Since the monetarist theory Sims 
examined was specified in terms of generic concepts 
like money and interest rates rather than specific data 
series, such swaps among alternative measures of these 
concepts seem to be valid tests of the robustness of 
Sims' results.
4 
I also consider the other modifications shown in 
Table 1. For lag length, I try both one and two years plus 
one period, that is, 13 and 25 lags for monthly models 
and 5 and 9 lags for quarterly models.
5 Since economic 
theory doesn't pin down the appropriate lag length for 
Sims' VAR, varying lag lengths is an appropriate test of 
the robustness of his results provided the alternative lag 
lengths are not implausible on statistical grounds. 
The remaining modifications in Table 1 are more 
controversial. Sims has objected to the addition of lin-
ear trends, even when they are statistically significant. 
His argument (Sims 1987, p. 444) is that because the 
responses of both money and output to surprise move-
ments in interest rates are low-frequency phenomena 
(that is, their responses are long, smooth, and slowly 
building), adding a low-frequency variable with no 
clear economic interpretation, such as a linear trend, 
just adds uncertainty to the estimation of long-run ef-
fects. Sims' critics obviously feel differently about the 
validity of checking robustness by adding trends since 
almost all have done it. In my study, I try to highlight 
when trend terms have an important effect on the 
results.
6 
Sims has not objected in print to checking his results 
with quarterly rather than monthly data. In fact, he has 
done this sort of temporal aggregation himself (Sims 
1987). Nonetheless, the statistical theory of time series 
analysis shows that, in general, temporal aggregation 
can cause the estimates of the relationships among 
variables to become quite misleading. Lawrence Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1987) have argued that this 
may be a particularly serious problem in models with 
money and output. Therefore, I try to test whether the 
changes produced by switching to quarterly versions of 
Sims' model reflect nonrobustness or merely errors 
induced by temporal aggregation. 
As did some of Sims' critics, I use a somewhat 
different time period for estimating my models. Sims 
used data from 1947 to 1978. After allowing for one 
year of lagged values, he was able to fit his model to 
data from the beginning of 1948 through the end of 
1978. Some of my data were not available before 1948. 
Furthermore, I work with up to nine quarters of lagged 
data, so I can only begin estimating the model in the 
second quarter of 1950. To keep the results of my many 
models comparable, I use one sample period in which 
the estimation of all of my models begins at that time 
(or in April 1950 for monthly models) and ends at the 
end of 1978. 
A problem with my data set, as well as with the data 
sets used by Sims and most of his critics, is that it may 
mix data from two or more significantly different 
periods of economic history. In particular, both histor-
ical events and statistical evidence suggest that for 
Sims' model a structural break (a change in the rela-
tionships among the model's variables) may have 
occurred around 1951. Early in that year, the Federal 
Reserve System signed a famous accord with the U.S. 
Treasury officially stating that the Fed would no longer 
adhere to the policy, adopted during World War II, of 
fixing the price of long-term government bonds. Both 
King (1983) and Sims (1987) have suggested that this 
change in Fed policy might have significantly changed 
the relationships among money, interest rates, and the 
rest of the economy. In addition, in testing various dates 
for a possible shift in the growth trend of GNP, 
Christiano (1988) has found the strongest evidence of a 
shift at about this time. 
4 As did Sims and his critics, I use seasonally adjusted versions of all data 
series except those on interest rates. Several of my alternative series are 
necessarily constructions. The official GNP and deflator series, for example, are 
available only quarterly. In monthly models, therefore, I use unofficial monthly 
series constructed as described by Hossain Amirizadeh (1985). Similarly, some 
official money series are not available for some time periods, so had to be 
constructed. My M2 data for the period before 1959 were provided by William 
Roberds. For details on their construction, see the paper by Charles Whiteman 
and Roberds (1989). 
51 add the extra period (for example, the 13th month), even though Sims and 
most of his critics have used even year lags, for three reasons. Extra lags can 
sometimes capture seasonal effects not removed by seasonal adjustment of the 
data. These extra coefficients are often highly statistically significant. And Sims 
(1987) has recently adopted this specification in reexamining his earlier work. 
6Based on the work of Martin Eichenbaum and Kenneth Singleton (1986), 
David Spencer (1989), and others, as well as on some experiments of my own, I 
ignore models with differenced data since they almost never seem to yield 
monetarist results. For the same reason, I will not report here results from 
models estimated with quadratic trends, even though I estimated hundreds of 
them. Quadratic trend models can, indeed, raise the importance of money. But 
this is almost always because they make the relationship between money and 
the rest of the economy nonmonist by, for example, making money's impact on 
output a strongly negative one. 
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My tests for a structural change in Sims' model in the 
1950-78 period agree with these studies: my results are 
also strongly significant by conventional standards. By 
contrast, my tests of the period 1953-79 show little 
evidence of a break.
7 Therefore, I will report all of my 
results not only for models estimated over the 1950-78 
period, but also for models estimated over the period 
starting in the fourth month (second quarter) of 1953 
and ending in the ninth month (third quarter) of 1979. 
Finally, I will report results for one causal chain, with 
intramonth influences flowing from policy shifts in a 
vertical money supply curve to interest rates (or money 
demand) and then on to prices and output. This reverses 
money's and interest rates' positions from those in Sims' 
causal chain, but I adopt it for two reasons. First, as the 
work of Sims (1980b) and Spencer (1989) would seem 
to predict, my results are rarely sensitive to which of the 
two orderings is used. Second, my ordering seems to 
conform more closely to monism, the theory Sims was 
evaluating, because it identifies monetary policy with 
intramonth shocks to the quantity of money. 
By concatenating all these variations of Sims' speci-
fications, I get hundreds of modified versions of Sims' 
four-variable model. For quarterly models, on each of 
my two sample periods, I can specify 48 modifications 
to use with each of the available monetary aggregates 
(MB, M1, and M2). (I have two interest rate series; three 
price series; two output series; two types of lags, short or 
long; and two trend conditions, with or without.) For 
monthly models, I can do the same except that monthly 
M2 data are not available. Thus, I get 144 quarterly 
models and 96 monthly models—240 models in all. 
For each of these models, I look not only at FEVDs, 
but also at paths of the dynamic responses of output and 
prices to random shocks in money supply and demand. 
Although most previous studies have downplayed or 
ignored these impulse responses, I find them quite help-
ful in picking out nonmonist models. 
... With More Conclusive Results? 
The Critics Are Right... 
My results partly support Sims' critics. Many of the 
modifications of Sims' (1980b) model that can be 
viewed as arbitrary do produce statistically significant 
changes in Sims' numbers, including his estimate that 
money's role in output determination is near zero. This 
estimate, that is, does not seem to be robust. 
• Robustness Tests 
My version of Sims' model is comparable to his. When I 
estimate it on the 1950-78 period, I get results that are 
Table 2 
My Version of Sims' Model 
% Shares That Each Shock Contributes 
to Each Variable's 4-Year FEVD* 
Variables 
and Models** 
Sources of Shocks 
Variables 
and Models**  C-Paper  M1  PPI  IP 
C-Paper 
Sims  50  19  4  28 
Todd  58  12  5  24 
M1 
Sims  56  42  1  1 
Todd  54  43  2  2 
PPI 
Sims  2  32  60  6 
Todd  1  18  56  25 
IP 
Sims  30  4  14  52 
Todd  40  2  14  44 
*FEVD = forecast error variance decomposition 
'Estimation periods: Sims, January 1948-December 1978; 
Todd, April 1950-December 1978 
Source: Sims 1980b 
mostly quite close to those Sims (1980b) reported, as 
shown in Table 2. The biggest differences are in the 
determination of prices and output. My results give 
money shocks less of a role and output shocks more of a 
role in price determination. And my results give interest 
71 used Sims' variables and either 5 quarterly or 13 monthly lags to conduct, 
respectively, quarterly and monthly versions of these tests. In all these tests, I 
computed standard F-statistics for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of 
the model were constant throughout the sample period versus the alternative 
hypothesis that all the coefficients changed at a certain date during that period. I 
varied the possible dates of the break from the earliest end-of-year (fourth 
quarter or December) period for which I could estimate the model before the 
break to the latest end-of-year period for which I could estimate the model after 
the break. The F-statistics for each of these dates were compared to two 
different distributions. One was the standard, asymptotically valid, theoretical 
F-distribution. The other was a small-sample F-distribution estimated by 
Lawrence Christiano's (1988) Monte Carlo method. To implement this 
method, Sims' specification was fitted to the data and used to generate 1,000 
alternative sample paths of the four variables. F-statistics for each possible 
break were then computed for the 1,000 alternative paths and sorted to produce 
small-sample distributions for each possible break date. 
27 rate shocks more of a role and output shocks less of a 
role in output determination. The later beginning of my 
sample period accounts for most of these differences. 
The rest are primarily due to my use of 13 instead of 12 
lags. The differences in causal chain ordering and 
revisions to data are unimportant. Since my version of 
Sims' model is so like his, I will evaluate the robustness 
of my findings, not his. 
Estimates such as those in Table 2 are statistically 
much less precise than they appear. To quantify this 
imprecision, I have estimated 90 and 95 percent prob-
ability regions surrounding the key results of Sims' 
model, as shown in the accompanying figure.
8 The odds 
that the true values of the FEVD shares are actually in 
each region are 9-to-l for the 90 percent region and 
19-to-l for the 95 percent region. As Runkle (1987) 
has emphasized, these regions are fairly broad. For 
example, my estimate of money's 2 percent share of the 
output FEVD provides only moderately strong statisti-
cal evidence against shares as high as 15 percent. 
I use the 95 percent probability regions to establish 
criteria for the robustness of the numbers I estimate for 
Sims' model. In particular, I will regard a statistic esti-
mated by Sims' model to be nonrobust if 
1.1 can find a modification of Sims' model, from the 
A Basis for Measuring Robustness 
Regions That Contain the True Values 
of the 4-Year FEVD Shares 
With Probability of 
9ft 90% (9-to-1 Odds) 
•I 95% (19-to-1 Odds) 
Point Estimates 
of Todd Version 
of Sims Model 
Output Variability 




Due to Shocks in 
Money 
0 20 40 
% Share of the 4-Year FEVD 
FEVD = forecast error variance decomposition 
class of modifications outlined above, for which 
the same statistic is estimated to lie outside the 95 
percent regions shown in the figure. 
2.1 cannot find a strong theoretical or statistical 
argument for disregarding the results of the 
modified model. 
• Test Results 
Some of Sims' results clearly satisfy my first criterion. 
Table 3 shows that many modifications of Sims' model 
produce significantly different FEVD shares when 
estimated on the 1950-78 period. For money's share in 
output determination, quarterly models are especially 
likely to give significantly higher results. In addition, 
linear trend terms often significantly boost money's 
share when used with Ml or MB, but not when used 
with M2. For interest rates' share in output determina-
tion, models without trends are more likely to give 
significantly lower results than models with trends, and 
M2 also seems to cut interest rates' share significantly. 
For money's share of price determination, the main 
boosting factor is choice of the data series on prices, 
with the CPI-S and the deflator almost always produc-
ing significantly higher results than Sims' choice of the 
PPI. Table 4 shows that my first criterion for statistical 
nonrobustness is also frequently met when the models 
are estimated on the 1953-79 period. 
No elaborate tests or arguments are needed to see 
that my second criterion for statistical nonrobustness is 
also met for some results for each period. Just look at 
the parts of Tables 3 and 4 that display the results for 
models with M1, the money variable preferred by Sims 
as well as his critics. No matter whether the specifi-
cation includes quarterly or monthly data, one- or two-
year lags, trend terms or no trend terms, some of the M1 
models have at least some statistics outside of the 95 
percent probability regions surrounding Sims' results. 
Neither Sims nor anyone else has offered any reason 
why swapping among these nonmoney variables is not 
a valid way of checking robustness. Thus, I conclude 
that at least some of Sims' (1980b) results are statis-
tically not robust. 
For Sims' most famous result—the very small share 
of money in the four-year-ahead FEVD of output—my 
8The Bayesian, Monte Carlo method of Thomas Doan (1988, p. 10-4) was 
used to compute 1,000 points in the posterior distribution of each result. These 
were sorted into a histogram. The probability regions were constructed 
basically by throwing out the lowest cells of the histogram, from either tail, until 
the remaining cells contained 90 or 95 percent of the mass of the distribution. 
The resulting highest posterior density regions are thus not necessarily bounded 
away from zero for FEVDs. 
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Tables 3 and 4 
Some Evidence of Nonrobust Results ... 
Number of Versions of Sims' Model That Produce FEVD Shares 
Outside the 95% Probability Regionsf 
Table 3 Models Estimated on Table 4 Models Estimated on 
the 1950-78 Period* the 1953-79 Period** 
Shares of Variability in Shares of Variability in 
Output  Prices  Output  Prices 





Model Characteristics  Money  Rates  Money  Money  Rates  Money 
Quarterly M1  5 Lags  No Trend  4  6  8  2  4  6 
Trend  9  0  9  4  0  5 
9 Lags  No Trend  2  7  8  1  7  4 
Trend  11  2  8  1  0  4 
M2  5 Lags  No Trend  12  12  0  12  10  0 
Trend  12  4  0  4  2  0 
9 Lags  No Trend  8  9  0  2  9  0 
Trend  2  3  0  1  3  0 
MB  5 Lags  No Trend  2  6  10  0  2  4  5 Lags 
Trend  10  0  8  0  0  2 
9 Lags  No Trend  7  5  8  0  2  5  9 Lags 
Trend  12  1  8  0  0  6 
Monthly M1  13 Lags  No Trend  0  4  10  7  3  5 
Trend  0  0  11  7  0  2 
25 Lags  No Trend  1  3  8  4  5  2  25 Lags 
Trend  8  0  8  3  0  2 
MB  13 Lags  No Trend  0  4  9  3  2  4  13 Lags 
Trend  2  0  9  0  0  4 
25 Lags  No Trend  3  5  7  0  2  1  25 Lags 
Trend  12  0  7  0  0  0 
FEVD = forecast error variance decomposition 
fTo get each number in these tables, 12 versions of Sims' model—differing only in their data series—were checked. Each number 
counts the versions, out of the 12, that say money's share of output variability is at least 15.9%, interest rates' share of output 
variability is at most 17.1%, or money's share of price variability is at least 24.9%. 
*This period is from April 1950 through December 1978. 
**This period is from April 1953 through September 1979. second criterion for statistical nonrobustness is met 
clearly for the 1953-79 period, but not so clearly for the 
1950-78 period. Table 4 shows that even many of the 
models most like Sims'—monthly Ml models with 
about one year of lagged values—give money more 
than a 15.9 percent share in the four-year-ahead FEVD 
of output when they are estimated over the 1953-79 
period. For the 1950-78 period, however, obtaining 
shares greater than 15.9 percent requires either further 
lags, temporal aggregation, or replacement of M1 by 
MB plus addition of a time trend. Sims (1987) regards 
addition of time trends as inappropriate, and there are 
potential statistical objections to the rest of these mod-
ifications as well. 
I find little statistical evidence against the addition of 
time trends or extra lags, however. Statistical tests of 
several of the monthly Ml and MB models that give 
money a relatively large role in output determination 
reject the hypotheses that the true model has 13 lags, no 
time trend, or both of these features when the alterna-
tive is a model with 25 lags and a linear time trend.
9 In 
addition, simulations suggest that the differences be-
tween trend and no trend versions of these models can 
be explained as the effect of erroneously fitting a no 
trend model to data generated by a trend model at least 
as well as these differences can be explained as the 
effect of erroneously fitting a trend model to data 
generated by a no trend model. For lag lengths, the 
selection criterion of Hirotsugu Akaike (1974) supports 
longer lag lengths more strongly than shorter lag 
lengths. The only statistical evidence against the long 
lag specification comes from Gideon Schwarz's (1978) 
alternative lag length selection procedure, which for 
monthly (but not quarterly) models favors lag lengths 
shorter than one year. Though Schwarz's criterion has 
some theoretical advantages over Akaike's, as well as 
over the other statistical tests I used, overall the 
statistical evidence does not indicate that the monthly 
models with time trend or 25 lags are unreasonable. 
These tests suggest that Sims' finding of a nearly 
zero share for money in the four-year-ahead FEVD of 
output is not robust over the 1950-78 period either. 
This seems clear if trend terms are accepted as arbitrary 
variations of Sims' model. Even without trend terms, 
however, some of the monthly M1 and MB models with 
25 lags boost money's share above the 95 percent 
probability region of Sims' model. 
. . . But So Is Sims 
Still, the results of my tests also partly support Sims. 
Few of the statistically reasonable alternatives even 
come close to overturning his general conclusion that 
the data contradict monetarist—or monist—theory. 
Unlike some of his numbers, that is, Sims' nonmonist 
conclusion is robust. 
It may seem obvious that if Sims' key numbers are 
individually unreliable, then any conclusions drawn 
from his analysis must be too. This is not true. Sims' 
results were more than just slightly nonmonist, so fairly 
large changes in his numbers are required to overturn 
his nonmonist conclusion. Also, the monist theory Sims 
presented some evidence against makes very strong 
claims about several aspects of the dynamic relation-
ships among Sims' variables that Sims did not report on. 
Nonetheless, a first round of tests shows that some 
versions of Sims' model do appear to be at least some-
what monist when estimated on the 1950-78 period. A 
second round shows, however, that there are statistical 
reasons for disregarding many of these and that the 
remaining cases have, at best, weakly monist properties. 
Finally, a double-check shows that Sims' conclusion 
gets strong support from the more statistically homoge-
neous period 1953-79. 
• Monism Testing: Round 1... 
Recall the monist view that monetary policy can be 
gauged by movements in the money stock and that 
these movements lead, are positively related to, and are 
the principal determinants of movements in both output 
and prices. In a version of Sims' VAR with shocks to the 
money equation identified as unanticipated shifts in a 
vertical intramonth money supply curve, this implies 
that the impulse responses of both output and prices to 
money shocks should be predominantly positive, es-
pecially at short-to-medium horizons for output and at 
medium-to-long horizons for prices. Furthermore, 
money's shares in the FEVD of output and prices should 
be large, at least by medium horizons for output and by 
medium-to-long horizons for prices. 
But just how large should they be? At least some 
prominent monetarists of the 1960s and 1970s seem to 
think that money's share of the FEVD of output should 
be well over 50 percent at business cycle horizons 
(Poole 1978, especially p. 64, but also pp. 1,2,97, and 
104; Friedman 1969, p. 146). Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963, p. 695) suggest that in an era of relatively mild 
cycles, such as the one studied here, money's share 
might be lower, only about 50 percent. They also sug-
9This is based on both standard and small-sample-adjusted likelihood 
ratio statistics computed for the monthly models in Table 5. For the small-
sample adjustment, see the work of P. Whittle (1953) and Sims (1980a). 
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gest that size for money's share of the FEVD of prices. 
To be on the safe side, I will set much lower 
standards to try to pick out some monist models. Under 
what I'll call my four-year test, I will regard a model as 
nonmonist unless it meets all of these criteria: 
1. Money's shares of the four-year-ahead FEVDs of 
output and prices equal or exceed 15 percent. 
2. Money's share of the four-year-ahead FEVD of 
output exceeds the share attributed to interest 
rates. 
3. Money's relatively large shares in the FEVDs of 
output and prices are not caused by negative 
relationships between money and output or prices. 
If a model has all of these characteristics, that is, I will 
consider it a candidate for a monist model. 
The third, nonnegativity criterion is based on an 
examination of the money-output and money-price 
impulse responses. I judge a model to be nonmonist by 
this criterion if all of these situations are true: 
a. At a certain horizon H (for example, two years 
ahead), the effect on output or prices of a surprise 
movement in money becomes negative. 
b. After H, the cumulative effect on output or prices 
of a surprise movement in money, measured by 
the sum of the money-output or money-price im-
pulse response coefficients beyond H, is negative. 
c. Money's share in the FEVD of output or prices 
does not exceed 15 percent until H or later. 
In other words, I regard a model as nonmonist if 
money's importance in determining output or prices 
seems to result from a negative relationship between 
money and output or prices.
1
0 
I will also work with another test of monism. The 
four-year test uses the horizons that Sims and his critics 
have examined most often. But monetarists might think 
that money's influence over output should be examined 
at a shorter horizon. For what I'll call my peak-response 
test, I will require instead that the peak in money's share 
of the FEVD of output exceed both 15 percent and the 
peak in interest rates' share of the FEVD of output.
1
1 
The third criterion of the four-year test will still apply in 
the sense that the peak output share for money will be 
defined as the largest share (among horizons less than 
or equal to four years) not attributable to a negative 
response of output to money (in the sense defined 
above). However, I will continue to check the money-
price relationship just at 48 months or 16 quarters, 
because it is almost never true here that money's share 
of the FEVD of prices rises above 15 percent for an 
early horizon and later slips below 15 percent. 
When I estimate my 240 models on the 1950-78 
period, I find that a sizable minority, displayed in Table 
5, pass one or both of my tests for possible monism. 
Among the 48 quarterly Ml models, for example, 11 
pass the four-year test and 6 others pass the peak-
response test. Although Sims' conclusion holds up for 
most of the models, at a glance the exceptions seem too 
numerous to regard his conclusion as robust. 
A glance may not be good enough, though. For 
Table 5 also shows some noteworthy patterns among 
the models. The sizable minority of models that pass 
either of the tests for monism tend to share certain 
characteristics. For example, among models with M1 or 
MB as money, quarterly models produce monist results 
more frequently than do monthly models. Yet, among 
models with M2, which I only have in quarterly form, 
none of the 48 estimated models passes either of my 
tests. This is primarily because the response of prices to 
M2 is generally small or negative. Among the monthly 
Ml and MB models, 25 lags and interest rates repre-
sented by T-bills seem to be necessary, but not always 
sufficient, to produce monist results. 
•. . . And Round 2 
These patterns suggest that before I judge Sims' conclu-
sion to be nonrobust, I should evaluate whether there is 
any reason to rule out the modifications that seem 
critical for that judgment. In particular, temporal 
aggregation—the switch from a monthly to a quarterly 
model—seems to be the one modification most likely to 
overturn Sims' conclusion. When the monthly and the 
quarterly models disagree, as some do here, which 
should we believe? 
Claims have been made for both types of models. On 
the one hand, time series analysts have shown, precisely 
10In implementing this third, nonnegativity criterion, I actually only check 
the FEVD of output at horizons 1,1.5,2,3, and 4 years. I also only check the 
sum of the impulse response coefficients between those horizons, such as the 
sum of quarters 1 through 4 or of months 37 through 48. For a quarterly model, 
my criterion would be the following. Let /= {4,6,8,12,16} and 7 = {1,2,3,4,5}. 
Define H: {0} U J - {0,4,6,8,12,16} as H(j) = 0 if / = 0 and, forj € J, H(j) = the 
yth element of /. Then a model fails my criterion if three things are true: (a) For 
some j € J, the sum of the coefficients in the response of output to a shock to 
money from quarter H(j—1) + 1 through quarter H(j) is negative; (b) the 
subsequent partial sums—from H(j) + 1 to //(/'+1), H(j+1) + 1 to H(j+2), 
H(4) + 1 to H(5)—are all negative; and (c) for i = 1,2, ...J— 1, the share of 
money in the FEVD of output H(i) quarters ahead is less than 15 percent. 
1 Actually, as indicated in the last note, I only check the FEVDs for the 
horizons corresponding to 12, 18, 24, 36, and 48 months. Since money's 
influence on output may peak sharply as a function of horizon, whereas interest 
rates' influence is likely to be smoother, my spot-checking may be biased 
against monism. 
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... And a Robust Conclusion? 
The Versions of Sims' Model That Pass the Monism Tests 
Model Results 
., . . A . ,, % Shares of Variability in 
Model Characteristics 
Output Prices 
Variables Due to Shocks in Dufi tQ 
Estimation Monthly Interest Number Constant Interest Shocksin 
Periods* or Quarterly Money Rates Prices Output of Lags or Trend Tests Money Rates Money 
1950-78 Quarterly M1 
Monthly 
M1  T-Bills  PPI  GNP  5  C,T  4-Year  28.6  24.2  23.8 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  5  C  23.5  14.4  48.8 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  5  C  19.2  4.9  60.5 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  5  C,T  30.8  23.9  61.4 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  9  C  17.3  17.2  56.4 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  9  C  15.3  8.9  56.1 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  9  C,T  31.5  16.2  58.5 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  5  C  16.6  9.0  64.6 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  5  C,T  28.0  28.0  65.8 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  9  C  16.0  6.7  54.4 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  9  C.T  24.2  21.3  55.3 
T-Bills  PPI  GNP  5  C  Peak- 16.1  8.9  25.0 
T-Bills  PPI  IP  9  C,T  Response  34.2  30.6  18.5 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  9  C,T  36.4  35.5  60.0 
C-Paper  CPI-S  GNP  9  C  28.5  13.1  52.0 
C-Paper  CPI-S  GNP  9  C,T  40.0  32.0  56.1 
C-Paper  Deflator  GNP  9  C  27.4  17.3  54.7 
M2  None  4-Year 
None  Peak-
Response 
MB  T-Bills  PPI  IP  5  C  4-Year  20.9  15.9  17.0 
T-Bills  PPI  GNP  5  C,T  24.5  21.0  18.3 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  5  C  22.5  15.5  32.0 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  5  C.T  25.1  20.5  42.5 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  9  C  25.3  15.6  32.0 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  9  C,T  38.5  29.5  33.0 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  9  C,T  49.2  16.7  38.8 
C-Paper  CPI-S  GNP  9  C,T  43.1  29.5  40.5 
T-Bills  Deflator  IP  5  C  15.5  14.4  43.6 
T-Bills  Deflator  IP  9  c  24.7  20.2  39.4 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  9  c  18.5  6.7  41.1 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  9  C.T  33.9  23.5  41.9 
None  Peak-
Response 
M1  T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  25  C  4-Year  19.9  19.4  49.6 
T-Bills  PPI  GNP  25  C,T  Peak- 27.8  22.5  15.4 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  25  C  Response  17.5  8.2  51.8 
T-Bills  CPI-S  GNP  25  C,T  28.7  26.4  56.5 
T-Bills  Deflator  GNP  25  C  16.7  14.8  50.6 
MB  T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  25  C  4-Year  24.3  10.5  34.1 
T-Bills  CPI-S  IP  25  C,T  34.4  22.2  32.7 




*The first period is from April 1950 through December 1978; the second, from April 1953 through September 1979. 
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and in detail, that temporally aggregating a model can 
significantly distort the estimation of dynamic relation-
ships among variables. This suggests that the monthly 
models are more likely to give an accurate picture of the 
economy's dynamic properties. (See Christiano and 
Eichenbaum 1987 for a summary of some of these 
results as well as for comments on the implications of 
temporal aggregation for analysis of the money-output 
relationship.) On the other hand, some of Sims' critics 
have suggested that quarterly versions of Sims' model 
are more trustworthy because the monthly data are 
more contaminated by measurement error (King 1983, 
pp. 9-10). These suggestions have not been backed up, 
however, by a precise and detailed analysis of why 
measurement error would make estimates of the econo-
my's dynamic properties taken from quarterly models 
more reliable than estimates taken from monthly 
models. So, on theoretical grounds, the argument for 
believing the monthly results is stronger. Still, claims for 
the quarterly models are buttressed by Sims' apparent 
position. Sims is familiar with the time series literature 
on the potentially misleading effects of time aggre-
gation. But in his published responses to his critics he 
has never complained about their use of quarterly 
models. And he has himself discussed both annual and 
quarterly variations of his VAR (Sims 1980b, p. 254; 
1987, p. 446). 
I try to shed some statistical light on this issue by 
testing whether temporal aggregation can explain the 




 For the specifications of Sims' 
model which are quarterly and meet my criteria for 
possible monism, I fit the comparable monthly version 
to the data from the 1950-78 sample period and 
compute the variance-covariance matrix, 2, of the 
model's fitted residuals. I then use the fitted monthly 
model and its variance-covariance matrix to construct 




 That is, the fitted monthly model is the true 
data-generating mechanism for 250 sample data sets. 
Each of these data sets is temporally aggregated from 
monthly to quarterly. Then, to all of the quarterly data 
sets, I fit one quarterly model corresponding to the 
monthly model that was used to construct the data. In 
effect, I pretend to be a lucky econometrician who is 
able to observe history replayed in 250 random varia-
tions. I use all 250 of these replays to obtain one precise 
estimate of the quarterly model that best fits data 
generated by the hypothetically true monthly model.
1
4 
Finally, for this precise estimate of the quarterly model 
that would result from estimation with time-aggregated 
data from the monthly model, I compute both money's 
and interest rates' shares in the four-year-ahead FEVD 
of output. 
My tests suggest that temporal aggregation does 
distort the estimates of relationships among variables— 
and thus may explain much of the differences between 
the monthly and quarterly versions of Sims' model. For 
almost all of the specifications tested, temporal aggre-
gation tends to boost the share of money and cut the 
share of interest rates in the four-year-ahead FEVD of 
output. After I adjust for these tendencies, only three 




 Furthermore, the monthly versions of those 
three models already give monist results, so little is 
added by considering them in quarterly form. 
This suggests I can ignore quarterly models. A 
precise and well-known effect, temporal aggregation, 
seems to be able to account for most of the differences 
between the monthly and quarterly models. The cor-
responding effects of data measurement errors are not 
well understood in this context and have not been 
explicitly modeled. Therefore, I conclude that the 
quarterly models' evidence against Sims is suspect and 




Eliminating the quarterly models from Table 5 still 
12I thank Larry Christiano for the basic idea for these tests. 
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 For each data set, the fitted coefficients are initially applied to the actual 
data from January 1948 to March 1950 to get a projected money/interest 
rates/prices/output vector for April 1950. To this projection, I add a random 
disturbance vector drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance-covariance matrix 2 to get the constructed data for April 1950. Then 
the procedure moves forward a period: the coefficients are applied to the data 
through April 1950 to project data for May 1950, and another random 
disturbance vector is independently drawn from a N(o£) distribution and 
added to the projection to finish constructing the data for May 1950. This 
procedure is repeated through December 1978. 
14This is done by Kalman-filtering the 250 histories with one model. 
Ordinary least squares regression, corresponding to Kalman-filtering with a flat 
prior, is used to fit the model to the first history. For history j, j > 2, the prior 
coefficients and the prior X'X~
X matrix containing information on the variances 
and covariances of the coefficients are set equal to the final estimates of the 
coefficients and the X'X~
1 matrix from the filtering of history j— 1. After history 
250, when the coefficient estimates have stabilized, fitted residuals for all 250 
histories are computed using the final coefficients. These residuals are used to 
compute the variance-covariance matrix of the quarterly model's residuals. 
15The adjustment is computed as follows. For each horizon, FEVD shares 
from the monthly data-generating model are subtracted from FEVD shares 
from the quarterly model fit to the 250 generated data sets. These differences 
are then subtracted from the FEVD shares of the quarterly model fit to actual 
quarterly data. 
16My temporal aggregation adjustments don't imply, however, that 
temporal aggregation can fully account for the tendency of quarterly models to 
boost money's share in the four-year-ahead FEVD of output above 15.9 
percent. This is further evidence that Sims' low estimate of money's share in this 
FEVD is not robust. 
33 leaves eight monthly models that pass at least one of my 
tests for possible monism. All eight of these specifica-
tions include 25 rather than 13 lags, and four of the 
eight include a linear time trend. However, as I have 
discussed, I find little statistical evidence for rejecting 
models with these features. 
Of the eight monthly models that pass my tests for 
possible monism, the weakest challenges to Sims' 
conclusion are the five involving M1. For these models, 
money's share in the four-year-ahead FEVD of output 
is not much larger than interest rates' share. In an 
absolute sense, too, money's share in these models is not 
very large. After all, according to monism, variations in 
the money stock are the predominant cause of business 
cycles. 
The three monthly MB models are much harder to 
dismiss. Unless further analysis reveals some serious 
defect in these models, I would conclude that they are 
evidence that Sims' nonmonist conclusion is not per-
fectly robust for the 1950-78 period. I do view Sims' 
conclusion as close to robust for this period, though. His 
conclusion holds for almost all of the monthly models, 
and the few exceptions require the use of very particular 
price (CPI-S) and interest rate (T-bills) series. 
• Double-Checking 
I also analyze the robustness of Sims' results for the 
slightly later but more statistically homogeneous 
1953-79 period. This can be viewed as simply another 
check on Sims' results or as a check on the robustness to 
time period of my analysis of his results. From either 
point of view, this alternative time period seems ap-
propriate for at least two reasons. It is close in time to 
Sims' 1948-79 period as well as to my 1950-78 period. 
And unlike periods that include data either before 1951 
or after 1980, the 1953-79 period is relatively free of 
evidence that the structure of the economy changed 
during it. 
For this slightly later time period, my analysis 
strongly supports the robustness of Sims' nonmonist 
conclusion. None of the 240 models I estimated, 
including the quarterly models, passes my tests for 
possible monism. Just as they did for the earlier period, 
M2 models for this period tend to give money a high 
share in the four-year-ahead FEVD of output. How-
ever, they also tend to give money either a weak or a 
negative relationship to the price level. Ml and MB 
models tend either to give money a small share in the 
four-year FEVD of output or to give money a large 
share that results from a strong negative response of 
output to money. 
Sims' conclusion thus appears perfectly robust for 
this slightly different time period regardless of temporal 
aggregation, lag length, detrending, or choice of vari-
ables. Combined with the small number of acceptable 
models that produced even moderately strong monist 
results for the 1950-78 period, my unambiguous 
results for the 1953-79 period are strong support for 
Sims' claim that the evidence his VAR provides against 
monism is robust. 
Concluding Remarks 
According to my analysis, each side of the debate 
between Sims and his critics has made valid points. The 
critics appear to be right that many apparently reason-
able modifications of Sims' model produce results 
significantly different than those Sims computed, in-
cluding those on money's share of output variability. 
Sims, however, seems to be almost always right that 
these numerical instabilities don't overturn an impor-
tant conclusion: the data don't support the version of 
monetarism he called monism. 
Consideration of the validity of each side's point of 
view leads me to a few generalizations about VAR and 
other time series analyses: 
• As did Sims (1987, p. 448), I question whether, 
in general, theoretical models that use generic vari-
ables like the money stock, interest rates, the price 
level, or output provide an adequate foundation for 
empirical work and whether, in model estimation, 
these generic variables can be more or less equally 
well represented by a variety of different data 
series. 
• As did Spencer (1989, pp. 452-53), I conclude that 
researchers using VARs (and other time series 
techniques) should examine the robustness of their 
results with respect to the kinds of changes in 
model specification examined by Sims' critics. 
• In judging the robustness of substantive conclu-
sions, however, researchers often should look at a 
broad range of the properties of the estimated 
models. Focusing on just one statistic, such as 
money's share in a measure of the variability of 
output, to the exclusion of a more comprehensive 
examination of the models' dynamic properties, 
may be misleading. 
• Modifications proposed to test the robustness of a 
result should be screened on theoretical and statis-
tical grounds to confirm that the modifications are 
neither implausible nor inherently biased against 
the result. 
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Practically, of course, all this robustness-checking is 
not easy—or cheap. But technological advances will no 
doubt minimize those problems eventually. And re-
searchers could well have deeper problems if they don't 
check the robustness of their results. 
Appendix 
Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks 
With Causal Chains 
In the work of Christopher Sims (1980b) and in the preceding 
paper, the fitted error vectors of vector autoregression models 
are estimates of reduced-form error vectors. These vectors are 
in turn assumed to be functions of unobserved underlying 
shocks to monthly supply and demand relationships. In this 
Appendix, I will describe and illustrate the causal chains Sims 
and I use to relate the shocks to the theoretical relationships. 
Sims assumes a causal chain running from interest rates to 
money and then to prices and to output. This assumption 
implies that the reduced-form vectors are related to the 
underlying shocks according to this model: 
(Al) ert = un 
(A2) emt = oLmun + umt 
(A3) ept = oipun + ppumt + upt 
(A4) eyt = 0Lyun 4- Pyumt + yyupt + Uyt. 
Here the e's denote reduced-form errors; the m's, underlying 
shocks to intramonth supply and demand; and the a, and 
y's, coefficients linking the underlying shocks to the reduced-
form errors. The subscripts t, r, m, p, and y refer to time, 
interest rates, money, prices, and output. 
This model could be interpreted in at least two ways. 
One is the interpretation Sims probably had in mind, which 
is shown in Figure Al. Here the intramonth money supply 
curve, equation (Al), is horizontal and the intramonth 
money demand curve, equation (A2), is downward-sloping. 
Monetary policy can be tightened by setting un to a positive 
number. This policy shock to interest rates shifts up the money 
supply curve, which leads to an unpredicted decline in the 
equilibrium quantity of money as consumers and firms move 
up along the intramonth money demand curve. Note that this 
interpretation requires that the coefficient am in (A2), the 
slope of the money demand curve, be negative. 
The other interpretation of the model is illustrated in 
Figure A2. Here the curves' positions are more or less 
reversed. Now equation (Al) is a horizontal intramonth 
money demand curve, and equation (A2) is an upward-
sloping intramonth money supply curve. Under this interpre-
tation, monetary policy would be tightened by setting umt in 
(A2) to a positive number, producing an unanticipated 
upward shift in the supply curve. This would cut the 
equilibrium quantity of money, but leave interest rates 
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unchanged. Month-to-month surprise movements in interest 
rates would be caused only by shocks to money demand. 
These shocks would induce unpredicted intramonth changes 
in the quantity of money, as the monetary authority slid along 
its supply curve in response to the unpredicted interest rate 
movement. This interpretation may seem less plausible than 
the other. But it is the only interpretation consistent with 
equations (A1)-(A4) when am, now the slope of the money 
supply curve, is positive. 
In the preceding paper, I use a different causal chain that 
runs from money to interest rates. This different order 
requires me to replace equations (Al) and (A2) with 
(A5) emt = umt 
(A6) en = arumt + un 
where the symbols all have the same meanings. 
Figure A3 illustrates my causal chain when an the slope of 
the money demand curve, is negative, as it typically is in the 
models I estimate. Equation (A5) then represents a vertical 
intramonth money supply curve, while equation (A6) repre-
sents a downward-sloping intramonth money demand curve. 
Monetary policy would be tightened by setting the monetary 
policy shock, umt, to a negative number, which would shift the 
intramonth supply curve to the left. This unpredicted decrease 
in the quantity of money would tend to simultaneously 
produce an unpredicted rise in interest rates, as consumers 
and firms slid up along their intramonth demand curves. 
If 0Lr were instead the positive slope of the money supply 
curve, my causal chain would imply the money supply and 
demand relationships shown in Figure A4. Here, equation 
(A5) is represented by a vertical intramonth money demand 
curve; equation (A6), by an upward-sloping intramonth 
money supply curve. Monetary policy would be tightened by 
setting positive values of un. These would produce unantici-
pated upward shifts in the money supply curve and higher 
interest rates, but no change in the equilibrium quantity of 
money. 
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